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Daniel M. Schydlowsky 
Professor of Economics, In the economic history of Latin America, a growing population 
The American University, demanded jobs; creating more jobs required industrialization; 
Washington, D.C. and industrialization made it necessary to cover a productivity 
differential. There were two feasible options for this purpose: 
i) to preserve allocative efficiency and generate a major regres-
sive income redistribution process; or ii) to lose allocative effi-
ciency but leave the distribution of income largely unchanged. 
Governments chose the latter and built in lasting distortions in 
the foreign exchange market. Import substitution industrializa-
tion ended in stagnation. Increased pressure in the labour mar-
ket could have driven wages sharply downward, but instead the 
informal market arose and, thanks to its monopolistically com-
petitive structure, segmented the goods markets and ensured a 
minimally acceptable form of income distribution. No govern-
ment policy was involved. The market generated a "natural" 
safety net on its own. However, allocative efficiency was sacri-
ficed and lasting distortions were built into the labour market. 
Financial development could not keep up with the new needs, 
and capital market segmentation further reinforced the distor-
tions in the price system. Structural adjustment policies re-
moved some of the price distortions in the foreign exchange and 
credit markets, and redistribution of property over the years 
changed the distributive consequences of relative price changes. 
However, with structural adjustment came an inflow of capital 
that generated substantial currency over-valuation, while the 
split in the labour market persisted, affecting even more work-
ers than before. In turn, trade liberalization has shown up on the 
books of the banks as weakened collateral and bad debts of 
companies now deprived of protection by lowered tariffs 
and an overvalued exchange rate. The market price system 
hence does not provide anywhere near the correct signals for a 
good allocation of resources. The need to earn some income 
continues to drive the growth of the informal sector, while do-
mestic capital and labour eye foreign investment with ambiva-
lence, uncertain as to whether it is friend or foe. 
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I 
Introduction 
Tensions between allocation and distribution in the 
context of economic growth have traditionally given 
rise to two main lines of inquiry. On the one hand 
is the set of concerns summarized by the Kuznets 
curve: is an initial rise in inequality in the first phase 
of growth unavoidable, or can it be mitigated or even 
completely eliminated by a suitable policy mix? 
The second line of inquiry has focused on differ-
ential saving rates: if the rich save more than the 
poor, then inequality will produce faster growth than 
equality. The policy challenge, then, is either to find 
forms of intervention that can equalize the saving 
rates or, failing that, to generate sufficient public 
saving to offset any negative effects arising from 
greater equality. 
A potential conflict between allocation and dis-
tribution already exists, however, even in a static 
context. It is well known that Pareto-optimality does 
not guarantee distributional acceptability. At the 
same time, attempts to correct distributive effects 
by policy interventions almost inevitably distort the 
efficiency of resource allocation. 
The existence of tensions between distribution 
and allocation during structural adjustment in an 
economy is thus almost to be expected on a priori 
grounds. 
In the Latin American context, the importance 
of distribution has been highlighted in a number of 
respects. First, there has been extensive research 
literature on income inequality in the hemisphere 
which generally concludes that Latin America has 
on the whole been much more unequal than other 
developing areas of the world, particularly Asia. 
Second, the role of distribution has been high-
G An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southern 
Economics Association Meetings in Washington, D. C. 
lighted as a driving force behind the creation of 
the traditional social safety nets: public wage setting 
mechanisms, legislation on fringe benefits, protection 
of unions, social security legislation, etc. Third, 
distributive considerations have been identified as in-
tegral elements in Latin America's inflationary proc-
esses. While some authors have regarded a number 
of notable cases of Latin American inflation as being 
the result of distributive fights between different or-
ganized sectors of society, there is quite widespread 
agreement that indexation, both implicit and explicit, 
has been due to attempts to insulate distributional 
shares and real incomes from the corrosive effects of 
inflation. 
The purpose of this paper, however, is to focus 
on quite a different range of topics. It is intended to 
look at the effects of distributive concerns on the 
pattern of sectoral specialization, whether explicitly 
as a result of government policy or implicitly through 
the functioning of the price system. 
We will begin by exploring how fundamental 
distributive concerns shaped industrialization policy 
and thereby determined the course of import substitu-
tion industrialization (ISI) in Latin America. We then 
proceed to examine how distributive concerns play 
themselves out spontaneously in the price system 
during stagnation, thereby determining the initial 
conditions for the structural adjustment phase. We go 
on to examine this latter phase to find out to what 
extent the earlier tensions continue to exist or have 
been left behind. Some new sources for distributive 
tension are also explored. The concluding section 
provides a summary overview of the above sequence 
and the arguments put forward. 
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II 
The active industrialization phase 
That the various Latin American countries are differ-
ent is a commonplace. Despite all the differences, 
however, there is a common pattern to Latin 
American economic development which is usefully 
captured in a set of stylized facts. We will ascribe 
this stylized reality to "Latinia": a "typical Latin 
American country". 
Before active industrialization took place (gener-
ally speaking, in the early post-World War II years) 
Latinia was a country where the principal economic 
activities were agriculture and mining, both largely 
for export, although some agriculture was devoted to 
satisfying domestic food consumption; where indus-
" trial products were largely imported, and where the 
exchange rate was set at a level enabling traditional 
exports to compete in world markets, while import 
duties were largely motivated by the need to obtain 
revenue for the treasury. Export production was con-
centrated in fairly large units, which were owned by 
a small number of people, most of them part of the 
country's elite, which also tended to take turns in 
governing the country. In addition, some export 
activities were owned by foreign investors. 
Industrialization was driven simultaneously from 
below and from above. From below came population 
pressures, fed largely by dramatic improvements in 
public health. A rapidly growing labour force could 
not be accommodated in agriculture or mining, since 
the natural limitations of the mining sector and the 
declining marginal product of labour on the land set 
severe limits to the number of additional people who 
could be employed in the traditional sectors. 
Industry, on the other hand, was only subject to 
man-made limitations to its employment potential. 
With sufficient replication of factories, any number 
of additional workers could be employed. Thus, a 
growing labour force which demanded work pre-
sented a cogent argument in favour of industrializa-
tion to the ruling elites, who certainly wanted to 
avoid having their boat rocked. 
From above came the concept of modernity. The 
elites recognized that modern countries were virtu-
ally synonymous with industrial countries. Wanting 
their countries to be modern, therefore, required 
industrialization. Since the pressures from below 
and from above coincided, there was no reason 
for Latinia's government to resist industrializa-
tion as a development strategy. 
However, developing industry in Latinia meant 
moving up the comparative advantage cost curve to 
higher-cost activities. Industrial processes had a higher 
cost than traditional agriculture and mining for a 
number of reasons: a) they were new activities, and 
therefore (during a learning period at least) they were 
going to have a higher cost than the ones in which 
the country had experience; b) industrial processes 
have economies of scale, and Latinia's markets were 
small, so that once again costs would initially be 
high; c) new industry would require supplier indus-
tries, which were non-existent, therefore making 
domestic production more expensive, as a natural 
consequence of the systemic nature of an industrial 
system; d) infrastructure was not oriented towards 
industrial production but towards agriculture and min-
ing exports; e) consumer preferences were strongly in 
favour of imported goods, which were presumed to be 
of better quality, therefore requiring an artificial price 
discount on domestic production. In addition, indus-
trial production would involve activities subject to 
advanced labour legislation, with rules on maximum 
hours to be worked, minimum wages, fringe benefits, 
social security, bargaining rights for workers, unions, 
etc., most of which were not applicable to agriculture 
and to small- and medium-scale mining. 
All these features generated a perceived require-
ment for the adoption of policies to make the new 
industrial production competitive.1 
The problem faced by policy-makers is illus-
trated in figure 1. The curve ss is the aggregate 
supply curve showing the cost differentials between 
the primary sectors of agriculture and mining and the 
new industrial sectors. R0 is the level of the exchange 
Note that the idea that infant industry protection is really a 
second-best alternative to perfecting the capital market so that 
the private sector can finance its own risk-taking was far too 
sophisticated an argument for the policy-makers of the time to 
have even remotely considered it. 
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rate, measured in pesos per dollar, which stands at a 
level which allows traditional production to continue 
exporting but at the same time is too low to allow the 
new industrial production to compete with imports. 
Accordingly, production takes place only on the part 
of this supply curve corresponding to the primary 
sectors. The policy problem is how to make the 
industrial activities competitive. 
In these circumstances, Latinia's government has 
basically three options: i) general devaluation, ii) selec-
tive devaluation, or iii) compensated devaluation. Let us 
explore each one in turn with the aid of figure 2: 
i) General devaluation: Under this option, the 
exchange rate R0 is devalued to Rp giving a larger 
number of pesos per dollar. Netting out any cost push 
effect of the devaluation in figure 2, it can be seen 
that with R,, a number of industrial activities become 
competitive. Moreover, there is expansion of primary 
production as primary producers move up the cost 
curve. At the margin, the productivities of the pri-
mary and industrial sectors are equal; therefore, there 
is efficiency in the allocation of resources. In addi-
tion, however, there is a massive redistribution of 
income, as the intra-marginal producers of primary 
goods obtain significantly greater income for the 
quantity they originally produced. This additional in-
come comes, directly, from the buyers of food on the 
domestic market and, indirectly, from the higher ex-
change rate which leads to higher prices of imported 
goods for all consumers. In consequence, with a 
general devaluation, owners of mining and agricul-
tural enterprises obtain a substantial transfer of 
income from all consumers. 
ii) Selective devaluation: This alternative in-
volves raising only the exchange rate corresponding 
to imports competing with the products to be pro-
duced domestically. Under this alternative, domestic 
production is made competitive with imports by 
levying import duties which effectively devalue the 
exchange rate only for the products for which protec-
tion is desired. In terms of figure 2, the general ex-
change rate stays at R0, but tariffs are levied on the 
importation of industrial goods, t¡ and tj, in order to 
cover the cost differentials for those particular prod-
ucts. Under this alternative, there is no expansion in 
the production of the primary sector and as a result 
marginal costs of production are different between 
the primary and industrial sectors, which signifies in-
efficiency in production. However, there is only a 
minimal income distribution effect, for in this case 
the original producers of mining and agricultural 
goods do not receive any windfall gain. The only 
redistribution that exists is between buyers of the 
newly protected domestically produced goods and 
their producers. This means mostly that high and 
middle income consumers pay higher prices for 
goods produced by lower middle class workers and 
high-income capitalists.2 
iii) Compensated devaluation:3 In this case, the 
exchange rate is devalued as in a general devaluation, 
from Ro to Rv but import duties are reduced by a 
similar amount and taxation is levied to pick up the 
windfall received by primary exporters. In the simple 
version of compensated devaluation, an export tax is 
2
 Low-income consumers are also affected by the higher prices, 
but in a much smaller proportion, since proportionately they do 
not consume as much of these kinds of goods. 
3
 First proposed by Marcelo Diamand of Argentina in CARTTA 
(1966), independently proposed by Schydlowsky (1967), later 
adopted with some changes into the mainstream by Balassa (see 
Balassa and others, 1982). 
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levied on traditional exports in order to keep the 
net exchange rate for traditional exporters at R0. In 
another variant, a Ricardian property tax is levied, 
designed to pick up the windfall revenue only on 
preexisting production. In either case, redistributive 
effects are kept to an absolute minimum, while effi-
ciency of allocation is achieved through a land tax 
but not an export tax, A final element of the package 
consists of a mechanism for returning to consumers 
the additional cost of buying traditional goods result-
ing from the devaluation which cannot be compen-
sated for by import duty reduction or by export 
taxation. It follows that compensated devaluation is 
considerably more complex to design and administer 
than the other two options. 
Seen from the perspective of any government of 
Latinia at that time, the obvious choice was alterna-
tive ii), protection. Alternative iii) was not even 
within the set of options, since it was far too complex 
in design, administration and execution. Alternative 
i) could have been feasible, but even an elite govern-
ment of Latinia would have been reluctant to under-
take a measure so obviously leading to concentration 
of income, let alone more labour based governments 
such as those of Perón in Argentina or Vargas in 
Brazil.4 Thus, country after country in the hemi-
sphere implemented the stylized logic of Latinia: 
raising tariffs in order to make the new industrial 
production competitive with imports. 
Once the policy was set, all the well-known 
consequences of import substitution industrialization 
began to fall into place: 
While economic growth ground to a halt, the same 
did not occur with population growth. New workers 
continued to enter the labour market but had ever-
increasing difficulty in finding jobs. Unable to find 
wage employment, workers became self employed 
for want of a better alternative. In essence, they 
4
 Pedro Beltrán, who acted as effective Premier under the second 
Prado administration in Peru (1956-1962), brought in the legisla-
tion that systematically raised protection to stimulate industriali-
zation. 
i) Anti-export bias restricted the new industry to 
the domestic market; 
ii) The "Inefficiency Illusion" made sectors 
competing with imports appear more inefficient than 
they really were;5 
iii) Partly because of the "Inefficiency Illusion", 
export promotion was mostly weak, with the notable 
exceptions of Brazil and Colombia, and as a result 
more import substitution had to be undertaken behind 
still higher tariffs if further foreign exchange was to 
be saved; 
iv) Vulnerability to balance of payments fluctua-
tions increased, as imports became progressively 
more essential; 
v) Foreign exchange availability determined the 
business cycle; 
vi) Borrowing was undertaken to increase 
foreign exchange availability, but in the absence 
of structural changes in relative prices and in the 
market orientation of production such borrowing 
only repressed the symptoms; expansion took place, 
while the foreign exchange borrowed was used to 
pay for imports, but then came the crash, made even 
greater by the need to service the debt. 
The structure of production in the traditional 
economy and the differences in comparative advan-
tage between traditional production and industrial 
activities gave rise to an underlying policy require-
ment induced by the desire to minimize distributive 
consequences. The effect was a trade policy which 
ultimately produced the stagnation in what has be-
come known as the "lost decade" of the 1980s. 
migrated from the labour market to the goods market. 
Initially they became street vendors and began to 
compete with established businesses by differentiat-
ing the product: they offered different locations 
(traffic lights, customers' homes), different packag-
ing (unwrapped, so that customers could examine 
the merchandise), and even different forms of sale 
(bargaining instead of fixed prices). 
5
 See Diamand (1973) and Schydlowsky (1972). 
Ill 
The stagnation phase 
TENSIONS IN LATIN AMERICAN STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: ALLOCATION VERSUS DISTRIBUTION • DANIEL M. SCHYDLOWSKY 
64 C E P A L R E V I E W 6 5 » A U G U S T 1 9 9 0 
The market structure corresponding to this part 
of the economy was monopolistic competition, with 
its two characteristics: price equals average cost, and 
excess capacity exists (see Chamberlain, 1933). In 
this informal market, total cost equals cost of mate-
rial plus cost of living. Moreover, since the cost of 
living is a fixed cost to be spread over the number of 
units sold, this generates a classical downward- slip-
ping cost curve, with marginal cost below average 
cost. In turn, excess capacity takes the form of under-
employment of labour. 
As the population continues to grow, more and 
more individuals crowd into the informal sector. 
Three responses then occur: i) there is innovation in 
the informalization of new sectors, new geographical 
areas and new products (e.g., car silencers are re-
paired on the street, informal clothing manufacturers 
sell their products informally); ii) the segmentation 
of already existing informal sectors increases, lower-
ing each individual's market share, as foreseen by 
Chamberlain; and iii) there is a downward adjust-
ment of the target cost of living, accommodating to 
the straitened market circumstances of participants. 
As a result of the combined effect of these ad-
justment mechanisms, the monopolistically competi-
tive sector of the economy grows, underemployment 
is rife, market "wages" are increasingly different from 
the marginal cost of labour, and the non-fulfillment 
of the Pareto conditions in the economy becomes 
more firmly anchored. 
The development of an informal sector operating 
with a market structure based on monopolistic com-
petition is a natural adaptation to distributive require-
ments. With competitive markets, labour income 
would fall precipitously. Legislation prevents this 
from happening in the formal sector, but evasion of 
the rules or their avoidance through informalization 
could lead to such income falls. In contrast, monopo-
listic competition spreads the available income. At 
the same time, the informal sector transfers some in-
come away from the formal sector by product differ-
entiation and even somewhat relaxes the macro 
foreign exchange constraint by shifting the product 
mix towards goods whose production is less intensive 
in foreign exchange. Thus, distributive requirements 
critically affect the mix of output and the choice of 
technology. But this occurs spontaneously, by market 
response. Along the way, the price system becomes 
firmly distorted, with a strong wedge installed be-
tween market wages and the marginal cost of labour. 
Developments in the financial market interact 
with this modification of the productive structure 
of the economy. During the pre-industrial phase, 
extending credit is a highly personalized activity. In 
this phase bankers know most of their clients person-
ally or are even related to them. Borrowing and lend-
ing occurs within a small elite where reputation is 
all-important. Moreover, the purpose of credit is typi-
cally a simple business transaction, most usually in 
the import or export trade. 
During the period of active industrialization, the 
nature of credit changes. Extending crédit becomes 
depersonalized, as banks grow and bankers hire loan 
officers, whose loss function is asymmetrical in the 
sense that whereas the banker risks his own money, 
the loan officer risks somebody else's. A bad loan 
will get him fired, but not making a good loan will 
not be noted. Thus, credit is extended in this phase in 
a much more risk-averse fashion. At the same time, 
borrowers are no longer known to the lenders. They 
no longer went to the same school, there are now too 
many of them to have family relationships or to have 
widely known reputations. Furthermore, the type of 
venture for which lending occurs is now much more 
long-term and much more complicated: for example, 
industrial production. As a result, collateral becomes 
the essential element in credit. With no collateral, no 
credit is extended. This introduces a very clear 
segmentation between those individuals who have 
assets to pledge and those who do not. 
As stagnation takes place and the economy be-
comes increasingly informalized, credit is available 
principally to the formal sector. Members of the in-
formal sector have no collateral, whereas formal firms 
do. However, the stagnation affects the quality of the 
collateral of formal firms. First, their cash flows cease 
to grow because of the stagnation. Second, their cash 
flows often shrink as a result of the inroads which the 
informal sector makes on formal markets. Deteriorat-
ing cash flows on the part of borrowers translate first 
into deteriorated collateral, and thence into an in-
creasing number of bad debts. Banks react at first by 
rolling over credits, expecting things to get better. 
But as the stagnation lasts, the unpaid bad loans form 
an increasingly large proportion of the portfolio, ulti-
mately putting the banking system under severe stress. 
"Credit layering" is a mechanism by which credit 
can be transferred from the formal to the informal sec-
tor-using as intermediates those formal Arms which sell 
products to the informal vendors. However, the scope 
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for this is very limited. First, a major part of the 
informal sector has no stable connection with spe-
cific formal firms. Second, the majority of informal 
vendors have no collateral to pledge: they may be 
here today and gone tomorrow, prefer to deal in cash, 
and constitute significant risks to the firms selling to 
them. For layering to acquire substantial momentum 
requires a change in the basis of credit. Rather than 
lending against the security of the collateral, lending 
(and repayment) must be based on the incentive 
of gaining access to ever-greater credit as a good 
payment record is accumulated. In other words, the 
credit function has to evolve from one based on guar-
antees to one based on incentives. This has indeed 
occurred in a number of cases, but it takes a long 
time to permeate the whole economic system.6 
The evolution of the capital market described 
above has two major impacts of macro importance: 
i) The access to credit in different quantities and 
at difference prices by the formal and informal sec-
tors reinforces a technological dualism which is quite 
independent of any labour market legislation. The 
result is two different labour income levels and two 
different decision structures.7 The distribution of 
credit thus helps to anchor significant distortions in 
the price system. 
ii) The deterioration in the portfolio of the bank-
ing system implies an increased operating cost which 
is not fully recognized on the books of the banks. 
Accordingly, the true cost of lending in the economy 
goes up. This is accompanied by an increase in the 
perceived country risk on the part of foreign inves-
tors, which raises the price at which the country re-
Structural adjustment policy consists of a basic pack-
age of measures intended to correct the existing dis-
tortions and composed of the following elements: 
i) Trade liberalization (almost free trade, e.g., 
low tariffs and no export subsidies); 
ii) A freely floating, "equilibrium" exchange rate; 
6
 For a highly illuminating description of the different phases of 
development of the financial system and its interaction with 
events in the real economy, see Otero, 1996, section 5. 
7
 See Ramos (1980) and Mezzera (1981). 
ceives capital inflows. Both internal and external 
factors, then, work to generate domestic interest rates 
well above international levels. Such capital costs, in 
turn, affect the international competitiveness of 
domestic production, consequently weakening the 
balance of payments, and this feeds back into the 
system in the form of a lower level of activity, greater 
informalization and further weakening of formal-
sector firms and their banks. 
At this point, the price system is affected by dis-
tributive factors in its major markets: 
i) The foreign exchange market has been seg-
mented by a system of de facto multiple exchange 
rates, constituted by a single financial rate and a large 
number of "product" or "commodity" rates, due to 
the existence of a diversified tariff and trade tax 
structure; 
ii) The labour market is severely affected by the 
difference between the average return to labour in the 
monopolistically competitive sector and the marginal 
cost of labour at large, as well as by the increasingly 
irrelevant but none the less durable labour legisla-
tion; 
iii) The capital market is deeply segmented due 
to the requirement that collateral must be provided in 
order to obtain loans and the weakness of layering. 
With the interdependence of markets in the 
General Equilibrium, it is clear that no market price 
equals its respective shadow price. Allocation by the 
market will hence not be Pareto-efficient. However, 
there is no guarantee that distribution will be satisfac-
tory either, although the structure of the labour 
market acts as a market-produced safety net. 
iii) Market interest rates; 
iv) Little or no government intervention in 
markets; 
v) Fiscal balance; 
vi) Privatization; 
vii) Labour market flexibilization. 
For our purposes, the most critical elements of 
this package are in the foreign trade policy area. Al-
most-free-trade with a flexible exchange rate trans-
lates in effect into low tariffs and a high exchange 
IV 
The structural adjustment phase 
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rate. In this sense, it is virtually the same as the gen-
eral devaluation solution which the Latin American 
countries failed to adopt in the early stages of their 
active industrialization phase. The following question 
then arises: If such a policy of low tariffs and high 
exchange rates was not adopted in the active industri-
alization stage because it was not distributionally 
acceptable, what has happened in the intervening 
years to make it a feasible policy now? 
The answer comprises two kinds of effects: 
i) differential changes in the productivity of sectors, 
and ii) changes in the structure of ownership of re-
sources. 
Productivity in the different sectors of produc-
tion of the Latin American economies changed at 
different rates as a result of a number of interacting 
factors: 
i) Learning by doing: firms move down the 
learning curve as they gain experience. Since there 
was more to learn in the newer industrial activities 
than in the older, more established, primary ones, 
productivity grew faster in the industrial sectors than 
in the long-established primary activities; 
ii) Export market penetration: Latin American 
firms learned to market their exports in a number of 
sectors in which they were originally not capable of 
selling abroad. This means that they received higher 
effective FOB prices, which is equivalent to greater 
productivity per factor unit deployed. 
iii) Freight rates and communications costs de-
clined: an independent factor which has raised effec-
tive FOB prices and lowered CD? prices for a whole 
range of products. In addition, as the nature of ocean 
transportation changed from an emphasis on general 
cargo to containerization, the relative cost of shipping 
non-bulk, non-primary commodities came down, trans-
lating on balance into higher effective productivity of 
industrial production. 
iv) Violence and insurrection affected rural 
sectors in a number of countries, notably Peru, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, and parts of the jungle areas of 
Bolivia and Colombia. Such violence increased the 
cost of production in the primary sectors, making 
them relatively less productive compared to the more 
urban industrial sectors. 
v) New crops were introduced in some countries, 
ranging from coca products to kiwi fruit. Although 
some of these crops were illegal, they helped to 
establish highly profitable, high-productivity new 
activities in the primary sector. 
The combined effect of all these elements was 
to flatten the aggregate supply curve, lowering the 
productivity differentials between the different 
sectors. This is shown in figure 3, which also shows, 
for comparison, the original supply curve from the 
beginning of the active industrialization phase. 
Changes in ownership, for their part, took two 
main forms: 
i) Agrarian reform: in many Latin American coun-
tries, systematic efforts were undertaken to transfer the 
lands of large agricultural estates to smaller producers, 
and in some instances to cooperatives or producers' asso-
ciations. More recently, there has been a move to encour-
age the active functioning of agricultural land markets. 
(ii) Mining properties: both metal ore and petro-
leum extraction activities were systematically trans-
ferred to State ownership, most often from foreign 
owners but frequently also from large domestically 
owned enterprises. This nationalization had the effect 
of transferring the profits of a large part of the pri-
mary sector to the State, in a manner analogous to 
what would have been achieved with a 100% tax on 
the profits of primary producers. In effect, this sys-
tem implemented a part of the windfall recovery 
scheme which could have been implemented in the 
early active industrialization phase through compen-
sated devaluation, but which was beyond the admin-
istrative capacity of the time. 
When both of these changes are taken together, 
we find that an almost-free-trade policy under pre-
sent circumstances would generate a smaller income 
redistribution effect than in earlier years, and that this 
redistribution of income would benefit a wider own-
ership group in agriculture and mainly the State in 
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the mining sector. In consequence, the distributional 
objections against a low tariff, high exchange rate 
policy have largely been dissipated. It would there-
fore appear that a policy which was rejected on dis-
tributional grounds several decades ago would indeed 
be feasible now. 
The reality of structural adjustment, however, 
has been somewhat different from the theoretical pre-
dictions. Rather than a low tariff with a high ex-
change rate, the reality has been a low tariff with a 
low exchange rate, as indicated in figure 4. The low 
exchange rate has been the consequence of substan-
tial capital inflows pursuant to a dramatic reduction 
in the perceived risk of investing in Latin America, 
as a result of the policy turnaround signified by the 
adoption of structural adjustment packages, together 
with the attractive investment opportunities offered 
by the privatization of public utilities and the high 
interest rates obtainable in the financial sector. 
The lower effective exchange rates have inter-
acted with interest rate liberalization and labour 
market flexibilization to produce a number of 
consequences: 
i) The low exchange rate has made a wide range 
of domestic products uncompetitive. This can readily 
be noted in figure 4. 
ii) As a consequence of the foregoing, an increased 
number of people have been driven into the informal 
sector. To the extent to which mis sector was able to 
accommodate this increasing population, through infor-
malization of a greater number of activities, through geo-
graphic expansion, or through reduction in target cost of 
living levels, the gap between the market wage and the 
marginal cost of labour became still wider.8 However, 
in some instances (e.g. Argentina) the informal sector 
was not able to absorb the influx, and high rates of 
overt unemployment resulted. 
iii) The pressure of foreign competition on for-
mal enterprises due to low tariffs, along with the rise 
in interest rates following liberalization of domestic 
capital markets, seriously weakened formal company 
finances, and this, in turn, weakened the quality of 
the assets held by the banks and increased their bad 
loan portfolio. A further consequence was to reduce 
the capacity of the banking sector to innovate in or-
der to provide the dynamic part of the informal sector 
with the appropriate depository and credit instruments. 
8
 Note also, however, that the reduction in the target income 
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iv) The stresses affecting banking systems led to 
the closure of financial institutions and, in some 
cases, to losses on the part of depositors. 
v) Weakened formal-sector companies sold out 
to foreign private investors or went bankrupt, thereby 
making space for new foreign-owned businesses to 
replace them. 
vi) Labour market flexibilization had little im-
pact, since the formal sector was suffering substantial 
shrinkage, and most of the action took place in the 
informal sector, where labour market legislation 
either did not apply or was not effectively imple-
mented. 
Parallel to these developments, the privatization 
programmes generated their own dynamics. Large 
privatizations were principally of public utilities, 
which because of their size had perforce to be ac-
quired by foreign investors, or at least by consortia 
with large foreign participation. Such investors, how-
ever, were well familiar with past experience in which 
government regulated their prices and constrained 
their profits. Therefore, in this round of privatization, 
investors made sure that adequate protection was 
provided in the terms of sale against domestic infla-
tion and/or devaluation and exchange control. In es-
sence, they obtained indexed returns in foreign 
currency. This created a direct link between the level 
of activity and profitability in the non-tradeable sec-
tor and the outflow of profits on the balance of pay-
ments. A similar phenomenon took place in the 
non-tradeable segment of the private-sector economy, 
where foreign private investment significantly ex-
panded its share in activities such as retailing (par-
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ticularly supermarkets). Here, too, the level of activ-
ity and the attendant profitability became directly 
connected with the outflow of profit remittances on 
the balance of payments. 
The inflow of foreign private investment has 
therefore given rise to three different important 
effects: 
i) An exchange rate level which is overvalued 
with regard to the long-term equilibrium rate consis-
tent with the low tariff regime; 
ii) A new distribution of property holdings, 
which may well be the harbinger of future distribu-
tional disputes; 
iii) A dynamic whereby domestic economic ex-
pansion leads to greater profitability of the non-
tradeable sectors, which leads to a greater outflow of 
foreign exchange in terms of remittances, which in 
turn limits the expansion on the balance of payments 
side. This amounts to a new form of the old foreign 
exchange constraint on Latin American growth. 
At this stage of the structural adjustment phase, 
the old distributional problems are interacting with 
the expectations raised by the structural adjustment 
policy itself to produce a new set of allocation prob-
lems: the capital inflows have generated an exchange 
rate which does not correspond to long-term balance 
of payments equilibrium, nor does it accurately re-
flect either the marginal social cost or the marginal 
social benefit of foreign exchange in the present. In 
V 
Summary 
More jobs required industrialization, and in order to 
achieve industrialization it was necessary to cover a 
productivity differential. There were two feasible op-
tions for this purpose: a) to preserve allocative effi-
ciency, while generating a major regressive income 
redistribution, or b) to lose allocative efficiency 
but leave income distribution largely unchanged. 
Governments chose the latter and thereby built in 
lasting distortions in the foreign exchange market. 
Import substitution industrialization turned into 
stagnation. Increased pressure in the labour market 
could have driven wages sharply downward, but in-
stead the informal market arose and thanks to its mo-
the labour market, the informal sector continues to 
drive a wedge between market wages and the mar-
ginal cost of labour, while in the capital market, the 
combination of collateral requirements and the accu-
mulated weakness of formal-sector firms means that 
interest rates do not effectively capture the marginal 
social productivity of investment nor the marginal 
social cost of savings. No market price reflects the 
true partial equilibrium of the corresponding market. 
Even less do market prices reflect the underlying 
general equilibrium levels of shadow prices. 
Moreover, the allocation biases operate in a di-
rection tending to delay convergence towards a more 
efficient price system. Since the value of foreign ex-
change is understated and the market cost of labour 
overstates its true scarcity, production activities will 
tend to underproduce and overuse foreign exchange 
while underusing labour. Hence the secular foreign 
exchange scarcity will be overcome at suboptimal 
speed, while the excess endowment of labour will be 
absorbed more slowly than is optimal. 
At this stage, the contribution of distributional 
tensions to the distortions in the price system resides 
on the one hand in the labour market, as evidenced 
by the existence and size of the informal sector, and 
on the other hand in the as yet not clearly visible line 
of cleavage between domestic factors of production 
(capital as well as labour) and foreign investors, par-
ticularly in the non-tradeable sectors of the economy. 
nopolistically competitive structure segmented the 
goods markets and ensured minimally acceptable in-
come distribution. 
No explicit government policies were involved 
in this. Distributional requirements drove the market 
to develop a "natural" safety net, but once again allo-
cative efficiency was sacrificed and a lasting distor-
tion was built into the labour market. 
Financial development could not keep up with 
the new needs, and capital market segmentation fur-
ther reinforced the distortions in the price system. 
Structural adjustment policies removed some of 
the price distortions in the foreign exchange market 
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thanks to liberalization. However, they induced capi-
tal inflows that gave rise to substantial overvaluation, 
At the same time, the division in the labour market is 
still present, possibly even more so than before, 
while trade liberalization, for its part, has shown up 
on the books of the banks as weakened collateral and 
bad debts of companies now deprived of protection 
by lowered tariffs and an overvalued exchange rate. 
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